Back to results

GKE Secret Access via Unusual User Agent

Detects GKE secrets get or list requests from a previously unseen combination of source IP, identity, and user agent, excluding the default Kubernetes client placeholder. Attackers who compromise a pod or steal a…

Description

Detects GKE secrets get or list requests from a previously unseen combination of source IP, identity, and user agent, excluding the default Kubernetes client placeholder. Attackers who compromise a pod or steal a kubeconfig often use curl, custom scripts, or atypical clients from a new host to read service-account tokens, registry credentials, or application secrets. Anonymous identities are excluded; use dedicated anonymous-access rules for unauthenticated probing.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

Known benign triggers

  • Administrators or CI jobs using a new workstation, bastion, VPN egress, or nonstandard API client can produce a first-seen alert; confirm against change records and expected automation.
  • Workloads or operators that change client libraries after a deploy may introduce a new user agent for an otherwise known identity; baseline after validation.

Detections can measure how the public catalogue is used — which detections people look for, and which pages bring them here. It sets a cookie that recognises this browser for 180 days. It is never linked to an account and never follows you to other sites. Privacy notice