GKE Client Certificate Signing Request Created or Approved
Detects creation or approval of a GKE CertificateSigningRequest (CSR) by a non-system identity. This is a breadth baseline rule for human or custom automation CSR activity on GKE. Attackers with cluster access can…
Description
Detects creation or approval of a GKE CertificateSigningRequest (CSR) by a non-system identity. This is a breadth baseline rule for human or custom automation CSR activity on GKE. Attackers with cluster access can submit and approve CSRs to obtain long-lived client certificates that survive token revocation and RBAC changes. Use companion rules to evaluate signer choice, requested identity, and self-approval behavior.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Approved certificate workflows (for example cert-manager, internal PKI rotation, or node bootstrap) may create or update CSRs from identities not in the exclusion list if they run under a custom service account. Baseline automation that legitimately approves CSRs and tune exclusions for those principals.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/ | 4 |
| kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/certificate-signing-requests/ | 6 |
| raesene.github.io/blog/2022/12/21/Kubernetes-persistence-with-Tocan-and-Teisteanas/ | 4 |
| stratus-red-team.cloud/attack-techniques/kubernetes/k8s.persistence.create-client-certificate/ | 4 |
| www.aquasec.com/blog/kubernetes-rbac-privilige-escalation/ | 4 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- ec67ab57-945a-4edb-84f8-1d7a51f46544
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: GCPData Source: GCP Audit LogsData Source: Google Cloud PlatformDomain: CloudDomain: ContainersDomain: KubernetesNoise: UnknownPerformance: NormalPlatform: GCPPlatform: KubernetesResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: PersistenceTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3