GKE API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity
Detects GKE API requests where a caller is impersonating a privileged cluster identity such as system:kube-controller-manager, system:admin, system:anonymous, or a kube-system service account. These identities have…
Description
Detects GKE API requests where a caller is impersonating a privileged cluster identity such as system:kube-controller-manager, system:admin, system:anonymous, or a kube-system service account. These identities have broad cluster-wide permissions including unrestricted access to secrets, the ability to create tokens for any service account, schedule pods on any node, and modify RBAC. Impersonating system:kube-controller-manager grants access to secrets across namespaces and service account token minting for lateral movement.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Break-glass admin tooling, security scanners, or approved controllers that legitimately use impersonation against privileged targets may match. Map expected callers and expand client.user.email exclusions as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authentication/#user-impersonation | 7 |
| kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/user-impersonation/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 00c2a946-bbe8-4345-941d-9ea13da91600
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: GCPData Source: Google Cloud PlatformDomain: CloudDomain: ContainersDomain: KubernetesNoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: GCPPlatform: KubernetesResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: Defense EvasionTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3