Kubernetes Pod Exec Cloud Instance Metadata Access
Detects Kubernetes pod exec sessions whose decoded command line references cloud instance metadata endpoints or equivalent hostnames and paths. Workloads that reach the link-local metadata IP, AWS IMDS paths, GCP…
Description
Detects Kubernetes pod exec sessions whose decoded command line references cloud instance metadata endpoints or equivalent hostnames and paths. Workloads that reach the link-local metadata IP, AWS IMDS paths, GCP computeMetadata, Azure IMDS token routes, or encoded variants are often attempting to harvest role credentials, tokens, or instance attributes from the underlying node or hypervisor boundary. That behavior is high risk in multi-tenant and regulated environments because it can expose short-lived cloud credentials to code running inside a container. The rule classifies a coarse cloud target label and whether the string looks like credential retrieval versus lighter reconnaissance.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005/ | 2from 2 sources |
| hardenedsecurity.io/blog/aws-imds-vulnerabilities-and-mitigations/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- a8e7d6c5-b4a3-2918-0f9e-8d7c6b5a4032
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: KubernetesData Source: Kubernetes API Server Audit LogsDomain: CloudDomain: ContainersDomain: KubernetesNoise: UnknownPerformance: NormalPlatform: KubernetesProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: ES|QLTactic: Credential AccessTactic: ExecutionThreat: IMDS Credential TheftUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3