Kubernetes API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity
Detects Kubernetes API requests where a user is impersonating a privileged cluster identity such as system:kube-controller-manager, system:admin, system:anonymous, or a member of the system:masters group. These…
Description
Detects Kubernetes API requests where a user is impersonating a privileged cluster identity such as system:kube-controller-manager, system:admin, system:anonymous, or a member of the system:masters group. These identities have broad cluster-wide permissions including unrestricted access to all secrets, the ability to create tokens for any service account, schedule pods on any node, and modify RBAC policies. An attacker impersonating system:masters gains full cluster-admin equivalent access, while impersonating system:kube-controller-manager grants access to every secret in every namespace and the ability to mint service account tokens for lateral movement.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Break-glass admin tooling, security scanners, or approved controllers that legitimately use impersonation with privileged targets may match if not covered by exclusions. Map expected callers and expand `not user.name` filters as needed for your environment.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authentication/#user-impersonation | 7 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- abb7bc31-b865-4318-80a9-b9ee4edd57b6
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: KubernetesDomain: CloudDomain: ContainersDomain: KubernetesNoise: UnknownPerformance: FastPlatform: KubernetesResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: Defense EvasionTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3