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Kubernetes API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity

Detects Kubernetes API requests where a user is impersonating a privileged cluster identity such as system:kube-controller-manager, system:admin, system:anonymous, or a member of the system:masters group. These…

Description

Detects Kubernetes API requests where a user is impersonating a privileged cluster identity such as system:kube-controller-manager, system:admin, system:anonymous, or a member of the system:masters group. These identities have broad cluster-wide permissions including unrestricted access to all secrets, the ability to create tokens for any service account, schedule pods on any node, and modify RBAC policies. An attacker impersonating system:masters gains full cluster-admin equivalent access, while impersonating system:kube-controller-manager grants access to every secret in every namespace and the ability to mint service account tokens for lateral movement.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform
Windows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

Known benign triggers

  • Break-glass admin tooling, security scanners, or approved controllers that legitimately use impersonation with privileged targets may match if not covered by exclusions. Map expected callers and expand `not user.name` filters as needed for your environment.

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