Kubernetes Pod Created With HostIPC
This rule detects an attempt to create or modify a pod using the host IPC namespace. This gives access to data used by any pod that also use the hosts IPC namespace. If any process on the host or any processes in a…
Description
This rule detects an attempt to create or modify a pod using the host IPC namespace. This gives access to data used by any pod that also use the hosts IPC namespace. If any process on the host or any processes in a pod uses the hosts inter-process communication mechanisms (shared memory, semaphore arrays, message queues, etc.), an attacker can read/write to those same mechanisms. They may look for files in /dev/shm or use ipcs to check for any IPC facilities being used.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- An administrator or developer may want to use a pod that runs as root and shares the host's IPC, Network, and PID namespaces for debugging purposes. If something is going wrong in the cluster and there is no easy way to SSH onto the host nodes directly, a privileged pod of this nature can be useful for viewing things like iptable rules and network namespaces from the host's perspective. Add exceptions for trusted container images using the query field "kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.container.image"
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| bishopfox.com/blog/kubernetes-pod-privilege-escalation | 6 |
| kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-admission/ | 3 |
| research.nccgroup.com/2021/11/10/detection-engineering-for-kubernetes-clusters/#part3-kubernetes-detections | 4 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 764c8437-a581-4537-8060-1fdb0e92c92d
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: KubernetesDomain: CloudDomain: ContainersDomain: KubernetesNoise: LowPerformance: FastPlatform: KubernetesProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: ExecutionTactic: Privilege EscalationThreat: Container EscapeUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 8, 2026
- Version
- 4