Kubernetes Pod Created with a Sensitive hostPath Volume
This rule detects when a pod is created with a sensitive volume of type hostPath. A hostPath volume type mounts a sensitive file or folder from the node to the container. If the container gets compromised, the…
Description
This rule detects when a pod is created with a sensitive volume of type hostPath. A hostPath volume type mounts a sensitive file or folder from the node to the container. If the container gets compromised, the attacker can use this mount for gaining access to the node. There are many ways a container with unrestricted access to the host filesystem can escalate privileges, including reading data from other containers, and accessing tokens of more privileged pods.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- An administrator may need to attach a hostPath volume for a legitimate reason. This alert should be investigated for legitimacy by determining if the kuberenetes.audit.requestObject.spec.volumes.hostPath.path triggered is one needed by its target container/pod. For example, when the fleet managed elastic agent is deployed as a daemonset it creates several hostPath volume mounts, some of which are sensitive host directories like /proc, /etc/kubernetes, and /var/log. Add exceptions for trusted container images using the query field "kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.container.image"
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| blog.appsecco.com/kubernetes-namespace-breakout-using-insecure-host-path-volume-part-1-b382f2a6e216 | 3from 2 sources |
| kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/storage/volumes/#hostpath | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 2abda169-416b-4bb3-9a6b-f8d239fd78ba
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: KubernetesDomain: CloudDomain: ContainersDomain: KubernetesNoise: HighPerformance: FastPlatform: KubernetesProfile: AggressiveResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: ExecutionTactic: Privilege EscalationThreat: Container EscapeUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3