Okta AiTM Session Cookie Replay

Description

Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session cookie replay attacks against Okta. This rule identifies when an Okta session is used from multiple IP addresses or with suspicious non-browser user agents after initial authentication. AiTM attacks capture session cookies via phishing proxies (e.g., Evilginx, Modlishka) and replay them from attacker infrastructure, bypassing MFA. The detection correlates session start events with subsequent policy evaluations or SSO attempts that occur from different IPs or programmatic user agents.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform: Containers IaaS Identity Provider Linux macOS Office Suite SaaS Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Known benign triggers

Automated integrations or scripts using service accounts with session cookies may trigger user-agent based detection. Consider excluding known automation accounts by okta.actor.alternate_id.
Mobile users switching between WiFi and cellular may show IP address changes. Correlate with device type and typical user behavior patterns.
Users legitimately switching networks (e.g., VPN connect/disconnect, office to home) may trigger IP-based detection. Review the geographic distance and time between IP changes to assess legitimacy.

References

Links the source published beside this detection. Reference is the link the source wrote, unmodified. Class is decided by this catalogue from the host and path, not stated by the source. Cited by counts published detections citing the same resource, including this one, and the sources beneath it count the repositories this catalogue ingests, which is not the same as independent research.
Reference	Class	Cited by
reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-shinyhunters-data-breach-targets-salesforce-amid-scattered-spider-collaboration/	Unclassified	Only this detection cites it
securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/investigating-an-aitm-phishing-campaign-m365-okta/	Unclassified	Only this detection cites it
www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/okta-sso-accounts-targeted-in-vishing-based-data-theft-attacks/	Security research	Only this detection cites it
www.elastic.co/security-labs/monitoring-okta-threats-with-elastic-security	Threat report	48from 2 sources
www.elastic.co/security-labs/starter-guide-to-understanding-okta	Threat report	48from 2 sources
www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/07/12/from-cookie-theft-to-bec-attackers-use-aitm-phishing-sites-as-entry-point-to-further-financial-fraud/	Threat report	Only this detection cites it

Detection rules

Okta AiTM Session Cookie Replay

Description

Detection logic

Detection requirements

Known benign triggers

MITRE ATT&CK mappings

References

From the source

Licence

Authorship

Detection rules