Potential Okta Credential Stuffing (Single Source)
Detects potential credential stuffing attacks where a single source IP attempts authentication against many Okta user accounts with minimal attempts per user, indicating the use of breached credential lists.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
Known benign triggers
- Corporate proxy or VPN exit nodes may aggregate traffic from multiple legitimate users.
- Shared systems such as kiosks or conference room computers may have multiple users authenticating.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 94e734c0-2cda-11ef-84e1-f661ea17fbce
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: OktaData Source: Okta System LogsDomain: IdentityNoise: HighPerformance: NormalPlatform: OktaProfile: AggressiveResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: ES|QLTactic: Credential AccessThreat: Brute ForceUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3