Stolen Credentials Used to Login to Okta Account After MFA Reset
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on Windows hosts indicative of credential compromise, followed by efforts to undermine multi-factor authentication (MFA) and single sign-on (SSO) mechanisms for an Okta…
Description
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on Windows hosts indicative of credential compromise, followed by efforts to undermine multi-factor authentication (MFA) and single sign-on (SSO) mechanisms for an Okta user account.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- A Windows administrator may have triggered a low-fidelity credential access alert during a legitimate administrative action. Following this, the administrator may have reset the MFA credentials for themselves and then logged into the Okta console for AD directory services integration management.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/ | 56from 2 sources |
| developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/ | 54from 2 sources |
| sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection | 17from 2 sources |
| www.elastic.co/security-labs/monitoring-okta-threats-with-elastic-security | 48from 2 sources |
| www.elastic.co/security-labs/starter-guide-to-understanding-okta | 48from 2 sources |
| www.elastic.co/security-labs/testing-okta-visibility-and-detection-dorothy | 45 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 5610b192-7f18-11ee-825b-f661ea17fbcd
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendData Source: OktaDomain: CloudDomain: EndpointDomain: IdentityNoise: LowPerformance: NormalPlatform: OktaPlatform: WindowsResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Rule Type: Higher-Order RuleTactic: PersistenceUse Case: Identity and Access Audit
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3