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Suspicious Write Attempt to AppArmor Policy Management Files

Detects processes attempting to write to AppArmor policy management pseudo-files located under "/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/". These special kernel interfaces are used to load, replace, or remove AppArmor profiles…

Description

Detects processes attempting to write to AppArmor policy management pseudo-files located under "/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/". These special kernel interfaces are used to load, replace, or remove AppArmor profiles (".load", ".replace", ".remove"). In normal environments, AppArmor policy management is typically performed by administrative tools such as "apparmor_parser" during system initialization or package installation. Direct interaction with these pseudo-files from shell utilities, interpreters, or scripting environments is uncommon and may indicate attempts to modify security policy at runtime. Adversaries may abuse these interfaces to weaken or disable AppArmor protections, introduce malicious profiles, or exploit vulnerabilities in the AppArmor policy parser as part of local privilege escalation chains.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

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Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

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