System Log File Deletion
Identifies the deletion of sensitive Linux system logs. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/live-off-the-land-an-overview-of-unc1945 | Only this detection cites it |
| www.elastic.co/security-labs/detecting-log4j2-with-elastic-security | 7 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- aa895aea-b69c-4411-b110-8d7599634b30
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendData Source: Elastic EndgameData Source: SentinelOneDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Defense EvasionUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Oct 8, 2026
- Version
- 4