Unusual Process Connection to Docker or Containerd Socket
Detects a process connecting to a container runtime Unix socket (containerd or Docker) that is not a known legitimate runtime component. Direct access to the container runtime socket allows an attacker to create,…
Description
Detects a process connecting to a container runtime Unix socket (containerd or Docker) that is not a known legitimate runtime component. Direct access to the container runtime socket allows an attacker to create, exec into, or manipulate containers without going through the Kubernetes API server, bypassing RBAC, admission webhooks, pod security standards, and Kubernetes audit logging entirely.
Detection logic
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Custom container tooling, CI agents, or monitoring may connect to docker.sock or containerd.sock from non-standard paths after relocation or bind mounts. Tune by process.executable or user.name when noise is high.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/ | 6from 2 sources |
| book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security/docker-breakout-privilege-escalation | 8 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- d70c966f-c5ef-4228-9548-346593cd422d
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Auditd ManagerDomain: ContainersDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: DiscoveryTactic: Lateral MovementTactic: Privilege EscalationThreat: Container EscapeUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3