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Container Runtime CLI Execution with Suspicious Arguments

Detects execution of container runtime CLI tools (ctr, crictl, nerdctl) with arguments indicating container creation, command execution inside existing containers, image manipulation, or host filesystem mounting.…

Description

Detects execution of container runtime CLI tools (ctr, crictl, nerdctl) with arguments indicating container creation, command execution inside existing containers, image manipulation, or host filesystem mounting. These tools interact directly with the container runtime socket, bypassing the Kubernetes API server, RBAC authorization, admission webhooks, pod security standards, and Kubernetes audit logging entirely. Attackers with host-level access may use these tools to create privileged ghost containers, exec into other pods to steal service account tokens and secrets, pull attacker-controlled images, and destroy evidence, all while remaining invisible to Kubernetes-level monitoring.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

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Detection requirements

Platform
ContainersESXiLinuxWindows

The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.

Log source category
event_index

Known benign triggers

  • Platform automation, node bootstrap, and legitimate break-glass admin sessions may use these CLIs with overlapping arguments. Tune by parent process, user, or host role (worker vs bastion).

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