Process Started from Process ID (PID) File
Identifies a new process starting from a process ID (PID), lock or reboot file within the temporary file storage paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run directory. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to…
Description
Identifies a new process starting from a process ID (PID), lock or reboot file within the temporary file storage paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run directory. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to track previous copies running and manage other tasks. Certain Linux malware use the /var/run directory for holding data, executables and other tasks, disguising itself or these files as legitimate PID files.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- False-Positives (FP) should be at a minimum with this detection as PID files are meant to hold process IDs, not inherently be executables that spawn processes.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf | 3 |
| twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1522964028284411907 | 5from 2 sources |
| www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor | 5from 2 sources |
| www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/linux-file-masquerading-and-malicious-pids-sandfly-1-2-6-update/ | 3 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 3688577a-d196-11ec-90b0-f661ea17fbce
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Auditd ManagerData Source: CrowdstrikeData Source: Elastic DefendData Source: Elastic EndgameDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: ExecutionThreat: BPFDoorUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3