Potential Direct Kubelet Access via Process Arguments
Detects potential direct Kubelet API access attempts on Linux by identifying process executions whose arguments contain URLs targeting Kubelet ports (10250/10255). Adversaries may probe or access Kubelet endpoints to…
Description
Detects potential direct Kubelet API access attempts on Linux by identifying process executions whose arguments contain URLs targeting Kubelet ports (10250/10255). Adversaries may probe or access Kubelet endpoints to enumerate pods, fetch logs, or attempt remote execution, which can enable discovery and lateral movement in Kubernetes environments.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Cluster operators and node diagnostics may legitimately probe Kubelet endpoints (for example /pods or /metrics) during troubleshooting. Validate the initiating user, session, and whether the target node/IP is expected for the host.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| heilancoos.github.io/research/2025/12/16/kubernetes.html#kubelet-api | 21 |
| www.aquasec.com/blog/kubernetes-exposed-exploiting-the-kubelet-api/ | 5 |
| www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/using-kubelet-client-to-attack-the-kubernetes-cluster | 8 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 6aa52f86-18f1-4a5a-a0ac-e2b5db8af589
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Auditd ManagerData Source: Elastic DefendDomain: ContainersDomain: EndpointDomain: KubernetesNoise: LowOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: DiscoveryTactic: Lateral MovementUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3