Kernel Module Load via Built-in Utility
Detects the use of the insmod binary to load a Linux kernel object file. Threat actors can use this binary, given they have root privileges, to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the…
Description
Detects the use of the insmod binary to load a Linux kernel object file. Threat actors can use this binary, given they have root privileges, to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. Manually loading a kernel module in this manner should not be at all common and can indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- LinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| decoded.avast.io/davidalvarez/linux-threat-hunting-syslogk-a-kernel-rootkit-found-under-development-in-the-wild/ | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 2339f03c-f53f-40fa-834b-40c5983fc41f
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendDomain: EndpointNoise: HighOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxProfile: AggressiveResources: Investigation GuideResources: OsqueryRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Defense EvasionTactic: PersistenceThreat: RootkitUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3