Kernel Driver Load
Detects the loading of a Linux kernel module through system calls. Threat actors may leverage Linux kernel modules to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from…
Description
Detects the loading of a Linux kernel module through system calls. Threat actors may leverage Linux kernel modules to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. As other rules monitor for the addition of Linux kernel modules through system utilities or .ko files, this rule covers the gap that evasive rootkits leverage by monitoring for kernel module additions on the lowest level through auditd_manager.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- LinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 3e12a439-d002-4944-bc42-171c0dcb9b96
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Auditd ManagerDomain: EndpointNoise: MediumOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Defense EvasionTactic: PersistenceThreat: RootkitUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3