Kubernetes Static Pod Manifest File Access
Detects Linux process executions where shells, editors, interpreters, or file/stream utilities reference /etc/kubernetes/manifests in process arguments. That directory holds static pod manifests read by the kubelet;…
Description
Detects Linux process executions where shells, editors, interpreters, or file/stream utilities reference /etc/kubernetes/manifests in process arguments. That directory holds static pod manifests read by the kubelet; interaction via editors, downloaders, kubectl, redirection helpers (tee, dd), or scripting runtimes may indicate staging or tampering with manifests for persistence or privileged workload placement. Pairs with file-telemetry rules that flag direct manifest creation on container workloads.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Cluster provisioning (kubeadm), configuration management, or administrators editing manifests during maintenance may match. Baseline approved automation and interactive admin sessions on control plane nodes.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007/ | Only this detection cites it |
| kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/static-pod/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- a698a653-e144-4e40-bade-35135935be45
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Auditd ManagerData Source: Elastic DefendDomain: ContainersDomain: EndpointDomain: KubernetesNoise: LowOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: PersistenceTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3