Network Connection Initiated by Suspicious SSHD Child Process
This rule identifies an egress internet connection initiated by an SSH Daemon child process. This behavior is indicative of the alteration of a shell configuration file or other mechanism that launches a process when…
Description
This rule identifies an egress internet connection initiated by an SSH Daemon child process. This behavior is indicative of the alteration of a shell configuration file or other mechanism that launches a process when a new SSH login occurs. Attackers can also backdoor the SSH daemon to allow for persistence, call out to a C2 or to steal credentials.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ESXiIaaSLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 4 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| hadess.io/the-art-of-linux-persistence/ | 3 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 63431796-f813-43af-820b-492ee2efec8e
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendDomain: EndpointNoise: MediumOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: PersistenceUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3