Potential Suspicious File Edit
This rule monitors for the potential edit of a suspicious file. In Linux, when editing a file through an editor, a temporary .swp file is created. By monitoring for the creation of this .swp file, we can detect…
Description
This rule monitors for the potential edit of a suspicious file. In Linux, when editing a file through an editor, a temporary .swp file is created. By monitoring for the creation of this .swp file, we can detect potential file edits of suspicious files. The execution of this rule is not a clear sign of the file being edited, as just opening the file through an editor will trigger this event. Attackers may alter any of the files added in this rule to establish persistence, escalate privileges or perform reconnaisance on the system.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 7 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
- T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsAlso under Privilege Escalation.34 detections cover this technique
- T1098Account ManipulationAlso under Privilege Escalation.409 detections cover this technique
- T1543Create or Modify System ProcessAlso under Privilege Escalation.118 detections cover this technique
- T1546Event Triggered ExecutionAlso under Privilege Escalation.106 detections cover this technique
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 3728c08d-9b70-456b-b6b8-007c7d246128
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendData Source: Elastic EndgameData Source: SentinelOneDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: PersistenceTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3