User or Group Creation/Modification
This rule leverages the "auditd_manager" integration to detect user or group creation or modification events on Linux systems. Threat actors may attempt to create or modify users or groups to establish persistence on…
Description
This rule leverages the "auditd_manager" integration to detect user or group creation or modification events on Linux systems. Threat actors may attempt to create or modify users or groups to establish persistence on the system.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms | 27from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- fcf733d5-7801-4eb0-92ac-8ffacf3658f2
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Auditd ManagerDomain: EndpointNoise: HighOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxProfile: AggressiveResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: PersistenceUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3