Potential Root Effective Shell from Non-Standard Path via Auditd
Identifies process execution events where the effective user is root while the real user is not, the process arguments include the privileged shell flag commonly associated with setuid-capable shells, and the…
Description
Identifies process execution events where the effective user is root while the real user is not, the process arguments include the privileged shell flag commonly associated with setuid-capable shells, and the executable path is outside standard system binary directories. That combination is consistent with abuse of setuid shells or similar helpers copied or linked into writable locations, a pattern used to regain a root context after local exploitation.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSOffice SuiteWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Custom administrative wrappers or hardened images that legitimately ship a setuid shell outside /usr/bin or /bin for emergency access may match; document and exclude by executable hash or path when verified.
- Field mapping differences between auditd versions can occasionally mis-populate effective versus real user IDs; validate raw audit fields when triaging unexpected hits.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/ | 3from 2 sources |
| gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/bash/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 7f3a9c2e-1d4b-5e6f-8a9b-0c1d2e3f4a5b
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Auditd ManagerDomain: EndpointNoise: UnknownOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3