Potential Container Escape via Kernel core_pattern Modification
The Linux kernel invokes the program named in "/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern" whenever a process core-dumps. When that value begins with a pipe (|), the kernel runs the handler from the host's initial namespace as…
Description
The Linux kernel invokes the program named in "/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern" whenever a process core-dumps. When that value begins with a pipe (|), the kernel runs the handler from the host's initial namespace as root, regardless of where the crashing process lived. Because the core-dump up-call is not namespaced, a process inside a container that can write core_pattern can register an attacker-controlled handler and then deliberately crash a process to have it execute on the host as root, resulting in a full container-to-host escape.
Detection logic
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| aquasecurity.github.io/tracee/latest/docs/events/builtin/signatures/core_pattern_modification/ | Only this detection cites it |
| github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm | Only this detection cites it |
| kubehound.io/reference/attacks/CE_UMH_CORE_PATTERN/ | Only this detection cites it |
| www.sysdig.com/blog/runc-container-escape-vulnerabilities | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 4872671a-c8d2-4847-9891-d3ce08b9e4c9
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Auditd ManagerData Source: CrowdstrikeData Source: Elastic DefendData Source: Elastic Defend for ContainersData Source: Elastic EndgameData Source: SentinelOneDomain: ContainersDomain: EndpointDomain: KubernetesNoise: MediumOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Privilege EscalationThreat: Container EscapeUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3