Potential Chroot Container Escape via Mount
Monitors for the execution of a file system mount followed by a chroot execution. Given enough permissions, a user within a container is capable of mounting the root file system of the host, and leveraging chroot to…
Description
Monitors for the execution of a file system mount followed by a chroot execution. Given enough permissions, a user within a container is capable of mounting the root file system of the host, and leveraging chroot to escape its containarized environment. This behavior pattern is very uncommon and should be investigated.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| book.hacktricks.xyz/v/portugues-ht/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/escaping-from-limited-bash | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 5ae02ebc-a5de-4eac-afe6-c88de696477d
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: CrowdstrikeData Source: Elastic DefendData Source: SentinelOneDomain: ContainersDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Privilege EscalationThreat: Container EscapeUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3