Potential Privilege Escalation via a Parent/Child Process Sequence
Detects a potential privilege escalation sequence via a parent/child process relationship. This rule checks for non-root execution of a parent process executable in a user or world-writable directory by a non-root…
Description
Detects a potential privilege escalation sequence via a parent/child process relationship. This rule checks for non-root execution of a parent process executable in a user or world-writable directory by a non-root user followed by a UID change event to 0 (root) by the child process. This sequence is indicative of a potential local privilege escalation exploit.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSOffice SuiteWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 9679c838-ec24-4e3a-bf0b-68a9878828c3
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendDomain: EndpointNoise: HighOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxProfile: AggressiveResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3