Potential Shadow File Read via Command Line Utilities
Identifies access to the /etc/shadow file via the commandline using standard system utilities. After elevating privileges to root, threat actors may attempt to read or dump this file in order to gain valid…
Description
Identifies access to the /etc/shadow file via the commandline using standard system utilities. After elevating privileges to root, threat actors may attempt to read or dump this file in order to gain valid credentials. They may utilize these to move laterally undetected and access additional resources.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersLinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| www.cyberciti.biz/faq/unix-linux-password-cracking-john-the-ripper/ | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 9a3a3689-8ed1-4cdb-83fb-9506db54c61f
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendData Source: Elastic EndgameDomain: EndpointNoise: MediumOS: LinuxPerformance: NormalPlatform: LinuxResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: New TermsTactic: Credential AccessTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3