Potential Etherhiding C2 via Blockchain Connection
Detects when a scripting interpreter makes an outbound network connection to an Ethereum blockchain endpoint for command and control purposes. Adversaries may leverage Ethereum blockchain infrastructure as a covert…
Description
Detects when a scripting interpreter makes an outbound network connection to an Ethereum blockchain endpoint for command and control purposes. Adversaries may leverage Ethereum blockchain infrastructure as a covert C2 channel to receive commands and exfiltrate data, as observed in campaigns like SleepyDuck malware.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| secureannex.com/blog/sleepyduck-malware/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- bba8c7d1-172b-435d-9034-02ed9289c628
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: macOSPerformance: NormalPlatform: macOSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Command and ControlTactic: ExecutionUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 4