TCC Bypass via Mounted APFS Snapshot Access
Identifies the use of the mount_apfs command to mount the entire file system through Apple File System (APFS) snapshots as read-only and with the noowners flag set. This action enables the adversary to access almost…
Description
Identifies the use of the mount_apfs command to mount the entire file system through Apple File System (APFS) snapshots as read-only and with the noowners flag set. This action enables the adversary to access almost any file in the file system, including all user data and files protected by Apple’s privacy framework (TCC).
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ESXiLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| theevilbit.github.io/posts/cve_2020_9771/ | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- b00bcd89-000c-4425-b94c-716ef67762f6
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: macOSPerformance: NormalPlatform: macOSResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Defense EvasionUse Case: Threat DetectionUse Case: Vulnerability
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3