Persistence via a Hidden Plist Filename
Identifies the creation of a hidden launch agent or daemon property list file. An adversary may establish persistence by installing a new launch agent or daemon which executes at login. Hidden plist files with…
Description
Identifies the creation of a hidden launch agent or daemon property list file. An adversary may establish persistence by installing a new launch agent or daemon which executes at login. Hidden plist files with filenames starting with a dot are particularly suspicious.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 4 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html | 7 |
| www.welivesecurity.com/2022/07/19/i-see-what-you-did-there-look-cloudmensis-macos-spyware/ | 3 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- e3f5a566-df31-40cc-987c-24bc4bb94ba5
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: macOSPerformance: FastPlatform: macOSProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Defense EvasionTactic: PersistenceUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3