Potential SIP Extension Enumeration
Identifies SIP OPTIONS requests targeting many distinct extension values from a single client within two minutes. Attackers and VoIP scanners use OPTIONS sweeps to discover valid users before REGISTER brute force,…
Description
Identifies SIP OPTIONS requests targeting many distinct extension values from a single client within two minutes. Attackers and VoIP scanners use OPTIONS sweeps to discover valid users before REGISTER brute force, toll fraud, or registration hijacking attempts.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersIaaSLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesPREWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
Known benign triggers
- Some legitimate provisioning or monitoring tools enumerate extensions during onboarding. Validate the source against known PBX management systems before closing.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046/ | Only this detection cites it |
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/ | 4from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- e7bf9314-f346-45b5-a6ed-044dc3b839c8
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Network Packet CaptureDomain: NetworkNoise: UnknownPerformance: NormalResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: ES|QLTactic: DiscoveryTactic: ReconnaissanceUse Case: Network Security MonitoringUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3