Potential File Download via a Headless Browser
Identifies headless browser execution from a suspicious parent process with arguments consistent with scripted retrieval. Adversaries use browsers because they are trusted, signed binaries that proxy and…
Description
Identifies headless browser execution from a suspicious parent process with arguments consistent with scripted retrieval. Adversaries use browsers because they are trusted, signed binaries that proxy and application-control policies allow through, bypassing restrictions on direct download tools.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ESXiLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msedge/ | 4from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 5f2f463e-6997-478c-8405-fb41cc283281
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: CrowdstrikeData Source: Elastic DefendData Source: Elastic EndgameData Source: Microsoft Defender XDRData Source: SentinelOneData Source: SysmonData Source: WindowsData Source: Windows Security Event LogsDomain: EndpointNoise: MediumOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: WindowsResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Command and ControlUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3