Potential Command and Control via Internet Explorer
Identifies instances of Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) being started via the Component Object Model (COM) making unusual network connections. Adversaries could abuse Internet Explorer via COM to avoid suspicious…
Description
Identifies instances of Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) being started via the Component Object Model (COM) making unusual network connections. Adversaries could abuse Internet Explorer via COM to avoid suspicious processes making network connections and bypass host-based firewall restrictions.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ESXiLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Processes such as MS Office using IEproxy to render HTML content.
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- acd611f3-2b93-47b3-a0a3-7723bcc46f6d
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendDomain: EndpointNoise: MediumOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: WindowsProfile: RecommendedResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Command and ControlThreat: Living off the LandUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3