Potential Credential Access via DCSync

This rule identifies when a User Account starts the Active Directory Replication Process. Attackers can use the DCSync technique to get credential information of individual accounts or the entire domain, thus…

Description

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform: Containers ESXi IaaS Identity Provider Linux macOS Network Devices Office Suite SaaS Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
Log source category: event_index

Known benign triggers

Service accounts that perform replication may trigger this alert on the first run per AD object, but they'll be suppressed in subsequent runs since this rule uses the new_terms rule type.

References

Links the source published beside this detection. Reference is the link the source wrote, unmodified. Class is decided by this catalogue from the host and path, not stated by the source. Cited by counts published detections citing the same resource, including this one, and the sources beneath it count the repositories this catalogue ingests, which is not the same as independent research.
Reference	Class	Cited by
attack.stealthbits.com/privilege-escalation-using-mimikatz-dcsync	Unclassified	2
github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml	Tool	2
github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage/blob/master/Atomic_Threat_Coverage/Logging_Policies/LP_0027_windows_audit_directory_service_access.md	Tool	2
threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html?highlight=dcsync#directory-replication-services-auditing	Detection test	2
threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/06_credential_access/WIN-180815210510.html	Detection test	2
www.elastic.co/security-labs/siestagraph-new-implant-uncovered-in-asean-member-foreign-ministry	Threat report	9
www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/credentials/dumping/dcsync	Unclassified	2

Detection rules

Potential Credential Access via DCSync

Description

Detection logic

Detection requirements

Known benign triggers

MITRE ATT&CK mappings

References

From the source

Licence

Authorship

Detection rules