Potential Kerberos Coercion via DNS-Based SPN Spoofing
Identifies directory-service access or creation events involving a MicrosoftDNS record that contains a base64-encoded blob matching the pattern "UWhRCA...BAAAA". This blob pattern corresponds to a marshaled…
Description
Identifies directory-service access or creation events involving a MicrosoftDNS record that contains a base64-encoded blob matching the pattern "UWhRCA...BAAAA". This blob pattern corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure associated with DNS-based SPN spoofing used in Kerberos coercion tradecraft. Adversaries may abuse such records to coerce victim systems into authenticating to attacker-controlled hosts while requesting Kerberos tickets for legitimate services.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- LinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| blog.redteam-pentesting.de/2025/reflective-kerberos-relay-attack/ | 3 |
| github.com/CICADA8-Research/RemoteKrbRelay/blob/main/README.md | 3 |
| github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/ocd-mindmaps/blob/main/excalimap/mindmap/ad/authenticated.md | 4 |
| googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html | 9from 2 sources |
| www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025.html | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- f701be14-0a36-4e9a-a851-b3e20ae55f09
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Active DirectoryData Source: Windows Security Event LogsDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: WindowsResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: Credential AccessUse Case: Active Directory MonitoringUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3