Sensitive Privilege SeEnableDelegationPrivilege assigned to a Principal
Identifies the assignment of the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege sensitive "user right" to a security principal. This right enables computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation. Attackers can abuse it to…
Description
Identifies the assignment of the SeEnableDelegationPrivilege sensitive "user right" to a security principal. This right enables computer and user accounts to be trusted for delegation. Attackers can abuse it to compromise Active Directory accounts and elevate their privileges.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| blog.harmj0y.net/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/ | 2from 2 sources |
| github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_alert_active_directory_user_control.yml | Only this detection cites it |
| github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage/blob/master/Atomic_Threat_Coverage/Logging_Policies/LP_0105_windows_audit_authorization_policy_change.md | Only this detection cites it |
| twitter.com/_nwodtuhs/status/1454049485080907776 | Only this detection cites it |
| www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/delegations | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- f494c678-3c33-43aa-b169-bb3d5198c41d
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Active DirectoryData Source: Windows Security Event LogsDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: WindowsResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: Credential AccessTactic: PersistenceUse Case: Active Directory MonitoringUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3