Potential Shadow Credentials added to AD Object
Identify the modification of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute in an Active Directory Computer or User Object. Attackers can abuse control over the object and create a key pair, append to raw public key in the…
Description
Identify the modification of the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute in an Active Directory Computer or User Object. Attackers can abuse control over the object and create a key pair, append to raw public key in the attribute, and obtain persistent and stealthy access to the target user or computer object.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- Azure AD Connect or ADFS provisioning can legitimately modify msDS-KeyCredentialLink when the writer account, source, object class, target DN, bounded change set, and post-change authentication all match an expected workflow.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| cyberstoph.org/posts/2022/03/detecting-shadow-credentials/ | 2from 2 sources |
| github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule | 2 |
| posts.specterops.io/shadow-credentials-abusing-key-trust-account-mapping-for-takeover-8ee1a53566ab | Only this detection cites it |
| www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/shadow-credentials | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 79f97b31-480e-4e63-a7f4-ede42bf2c6de
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Active DirectoryData Source: Windows Security Event LogsDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: WindowsResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Custom Query (KQL)Tactic: Credential AccessUse Case: Active Directory MonitoringUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3