Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call
Identifies suspicious process access events from an unknown memory region. Endpoint security solutions usually hook userland Windows APIs in order to decide if the code that is being executed is malicious or not.…
Description
Identifies suspicious process access events from an unknown memory region. Endpoint security solutions usually hook userland Windows APIs in order to decide if the code that is being executed is malicious or not. It's possible to bypass hooked functions by writing malicious functions that call syscalls directly.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- LinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278013896440324096 | Only this detection cites it |
| www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/using-syscalls-directly-from-visual-studio-to-bypass-avs-edrs | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 2dd480be-1263-4d9c-8672-172928f6789a
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: SysmonDomain: EndpointNoise: HighOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: WindowsProfile: AggressiveResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Defense EvasionTactic: ExecutionUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3