Potential Enumeration via Active Directory Web Service
Identifies processes loading Active Directory related modules followed by a network connection to the ADWS dedicated TCP port. Adversaries may abuse the ADWS Windows service that allows Active Directory to be queried…
Description
Identifies processes loading Active Directory related modules followed by a network connection to the ADWS dedicated TCP port. Adversaries may abuse the ADWS Windows service that allows Active Directory to be queried via this web service.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound | 4from 3 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 9c951837-7d13-4b0c-be7a-f346623c8795
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendDomain: EndpointNoise: MediumOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: WindowsResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: DiscoveryUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3