Suspicious Child Process via Azure VM CustomScript Extension
Identifies a suspicious process executing as a descendant of the Azure VM CustomScript extension handler (CustomScriptHandler.exe) on a Windows host. The Azure CustomScript extension runs an attacker-supplied script…
Description
Identifies a suspicious process executing as a descendant of the Azure VM CustomScript extension handler (CustomScriptHandler.exe) on a Windows host. The Azure CustomScript extension runs an attacker-supplied script with high privilege (SYSTEM) via the guest agent, and is a common cloud-to-host code-execution and persistence primitive. Because the extension's resource name is attacker-controlled and absent from on-host telemetry, this rule anchors on the type-bearing handler binary ('Microsoft.Compute.CustomScriptExtension\...\CustomScriptHandler.exe') rather than the spoofable extension name, making it resistant to renaming. CustomScript legitimately launches PowerShell and cmd, so the rule fires only when the descendant is an execution-proxy, download, or discovery LOLBin, or PowerShell exhibiting suspicious tradecraft.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| blog.pwnedlabs.io/diving-deep-into-azure-vm-attack-vectors | 6 |
| learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/extensions/custom-script-windows | 3 |
| www.sysdig.com/blog/the-expendable-extension-name-azure-vmaccess-naming-chaos-password-resets-and-a-detection-gap | 4 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- b4d4f0fb-908e-4cd1-ac8f-795c0433db0a
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Elastic DefendDomain: EndpointNoise: UnknownOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: WindowsResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Defense EvasionTactic: ExecutionThreat: Cloud VM ExecutionThreat: Living off the LandUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3