Persistence via Microsoft Outlook VBA
Detects attempts to establish persistence on an endpoint by installing a rogue Microsoft Outlook VBA Template.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- Office SuiteWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
Known benign triggers
- A legitimate VBA for Outlook is usually configured interactively via OUTLOOK.EXE.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
1 exclusive technique.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| www.linkedin.com/pulse/outlook-backdoor-using-vba-samir-b-/ | 3from 2 sources |
| www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/11/a-fresh-outlook-on-mail-based-persistence/ | 4from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 397945f3-d39a-4e6f-8bcb-9656c2031438
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: CrowdstrikeData Source: Elastic DefendData Source: Elastic EndgameData Source: Microsoft Defender XDRData Source: SentinelOneData Source: SysmonDomain: EndpointNoise: MediumOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: WindowsResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: PersistenceUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3