Startup Persistence by a Suspicious Process

Identifies files written to or modified in the startup folder by commonly abused processes. Adversaries may use this technique to maintain persistence.

Detection logic

Its licence does not clear it for publishing here

Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.

Detection requirements

Platform: Linux macOS Network Devices Windows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
Log source category: event_index

References

Links the source published beside this detection. Reference is the link the source wrote, unmodified. Class is decided by this catalogue from the host and path, not stated by the source. Cited by counts published detections citing the same resource, including this one, and the sources beneath it count the repositories this catalogue ingests, which is not the same as independent research.
Reference	Class	Cited by
www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-security-uncovers-blister-malware-campaign	Threat report	5
www.elastic.co/security-labs/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1	Threat report	5

Detection rules

Startup Persistence by a Suspicious Process

Detection logic

Detection requirements

MITRE ATT&CK mappings

References

From the source

Licence

Authorship

Detection rules