dMSA Account Creation by an Unusual User
Detects creation of a delegated Managed Service Account by an unusual subject account. Attackers can abuse weak child-object or msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount rights during account migration to elevate privileges.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
Sunturai publishes a detection's own text where the licence it arrived under has been reviewed and permits it, and Elastic License 2.0 has not. The query as its source wrote it, its canonical form and the hash that pins this revision are in the workspace record.
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 3 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-dmsa-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory | 2 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- f0dbff4c-1aa7-4458-9ed5-ada472f64970
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Active DirectoryData Source: Windows Security Event LogsDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: WindowsResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: New TermsTactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Active Directory MonitoringUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3