Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition
Detects the first occurrence of a modification to Group Policy Object Attributes to add privileges to user accounts or use them to add users as local admins.
Detection logic
Its licence does not clear it for publishing here
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Detection requirements
- Platform
- Identity ProviderWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- event_index
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| github.com/atc-project/atc-data/blob/master/docs/Logging_Policies/LP_0025_windows_audit_directory_service_changes.md | 3 |
| labs.withsecure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- b9554892-5e0e-424b-83a0-5aef95aa43bf
- Tagged by the source as
- Data Source: Active DirectoryData Source: Windows Security Event LogsDomain: EndpointNoise: LowOS: WindowsPerformance: NormalPlatform: WindowsResources: Investigation GuideRule Type: Event Correlation (EQL)Tactic: Privilege EscalationUse Case: Active Directory MonitoringUse Case: Threat Detection
Licence
- Published under
- Elastic License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 20, 2026
- Version
- 3