Possible contact with a domain generated by a DGA
Identifies contacts with domains names in CommonSecurityLog that might have been generated by a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA). DGAs can be used by malware to generate rendezvous points that are difficult to…
Description
Identifies contacts with domains names in CommonSecurityLog that might have been generated by a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA). DGAs can be used by malware to generate rendezvous points that are difficult to predict in advance. This detection uses the Alexa Top 1 million domain names to build a model of what normal domains look like. It uses this to identify domains that may have been randomly generated by an algorithm. The triThreshold is set to 500 - increase this to report on domains that are less likely to have been randomly generated, decrease it for more likely. The start time and end time look back over 6 hours of data and the dgaLengthThreshold is set to 8 - meaning domains whose length is 8 or more are reported. NOTE - The top1M csv zip file used in the query is dynamic and may produce different results over various time periods. It's important to cross-check the events against the entities involved in the incident.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ESXiLinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source product
- barracudacefcheckpointciscoasaf5fortinetpaloaltonetworkszscaler
- Log source service
- commonsecuritylog
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 4acd3a04-2fad-4efc-8a4b-51476594cec4
- Tagged by the source as
- CommandAndControlSecurity - Others
Licence
- Published under
- MIT LicenseRead the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- MITRead the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 2, 2026
- Version
- 1