Audit policy manipulation using auditpol utility
This detects attempts to manipulate audit policies using auditpol command. This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.…
Description
This detects attempts to manipulate audit policies using auditpol command. This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks. The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it. Refer to auditpol syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol Refer to our M365 blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersIaaSLinuxmacOSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source product
- microsoftthreatprotectionsecurityevents
- Log source service
- deviceprocesseventssecurityevent
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1
- Tagged by the source as
- ExecutionSecurity - Others
Licence
- Published under
- MIT LicenseRead the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- MITRead the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 2, 2026
- Version
- 1