Email access via active sync
This query detects attempts to add attacker devices as allowed IDs for active sync using the Set-CASMailbox command. This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential…
Description
This query detects attempts to add attacker devices as allowed IDs for active sync using the Set-CASMailbox command. This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks. - Note that this query can be changed to use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon. In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list. - Refer to Set-CASMailbox syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/exchange/set-casmailbox?view=exchange-ps
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ContainersESXiIaaSIdentity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the 2 ATT&CK techniques it maps to.
- Log source product
- microsoftthreatprotectionsecurityeventswindowsforwardedeventswindowssecurityevents
- Log source service
- deviceprocesseventssecurityeventsecurityeventswindowsevent
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
No references are available for this detection.
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 2f561e20-d97b-4b13-b02d-18b34af6e87c
- Tagged by the source as
- PrivilegeEscalationSecurity - Threat Protection
Licence
- Published under
- MIT LicenseRead the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- MITRead the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Sep 2, 2026
- Version
- 1