ESXi Malicious VIB Forced Install
Detects potentially malicious installation of VMware Installation Bundles (VIBs) using the --force flag. The --force option bypasses signature and compatibility checks, allowing unsigned, community-supported, or…
Description
Detects potentially malicious installation of VMware Installation Bundles (VIBs) using the --force flag. The --force option bypasses signature and compatibility checks, allowing unsigned, community-supported, or incompatible VIBs to be installed on an ESXi host. This behavior is uncommon in normal administrative operations and is often observed in post-compromise scenarios where adversaries attempt to install backdoored or unauthorized kernel modules, drivers, or monitoring tools to establish persistence or gain deeper control of the hypervisor.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- ESXi
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- vmware_esxi_syslog
Known benign triggers
- Some third party vendor VIBs or patches may require the force option.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
1 exclusive technique.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| detect.fyi/detecting-and-responding-to-esxi-compromise-with-splunk-f33998ce7823 | 4 |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 5d4d2cd2-7b65-4474-97cf-e9b203bcd770
- Tagged by the source as
- Black Basta RansomwareChina-Nexus Threat ActivityESXi Post CompromiseInfrastructureapplicationSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securityendpoint
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1