AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail
The following analytic detects `StopLogging` events in AWS CloudTrail logs. It leverages CloudTrail event data to identify when logging is intentionally stopped, excluding console-based actions and focusing on…
Description
The following analytic detects `StopLogging` events in AWS CloudTrail logs. It leverages CloudTrail event data to identify when logging is intentionally stopped, excluding console-based actions and focusing on successful attempts. This activity is significant because adversaries may stop logging to evade detection and operate stealthily within the compromised environment. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to perform further activities without being logged, hindering incident response and forensic investigations, and potentially leading to unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderOffice SuiteSaaS
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- aws_cloudtrail_stoplogging
Known benign triggers
- While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has stopped cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008/ | 12from 2 sources |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- 8a2f3ca2-4eb5-4389-a549-14063882e537
- Tagged by the source as
- AWS Defense EvasionAWS AccountcloudSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securitythreat
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Written by
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1