Azure AD Service Principal New Client Credentials
The following analytic detects the addition of new credentials to Service Principals and Applications in Azure AD. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs, specifically monitoring the "Update application*Certificates and…
Description
The following analytic detects the addition of new credentials to Service Principals and Applications in Azure AD. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs, specifically monitoring the "Update application*Certificates and secrets management" operation. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges within the Azure environment. If confirmed malicious, attackers could use these new credentials to log in as the service principal, potentially compromising sensitive accounts and resources, leading to unauthorized access and control over the Azure environment.
Detection logic
Detection requirements
- Platform
- IaaSIdentity ProviderSaaS
The rule states no platform. This is derived from the ATT&CK technique it maps to.
- Log source category
- azure_active_directory
Known benign triggers
- Service Principal client credential modifications may be part of legitimate administrative operations. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK mappings
0 exclusive techniques.This is coverage no other published rule has; it is not this rule's total technique count.
References
| Reference | Cited by |
|---|---|
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001/ | 2 |
| hausec.com/2021/10/26/attacking-azure-azure-ad-part-ii/ | Only this detection cites it |
| microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/Persistence/AZT501/AZT501-2/ | 4 |
| microsoft.github.io/Azure-Threat-Research-Matrix/PrivilegeEscalation/AZT405/AZT405-3/ | Only this detection cites it |
| www.inversecos.com/2021/10/how-to-backdoor-azure-applications-and.html | 2 |
| www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft | Only this detection cites it |
From the source
- At source
- Open at source
- Upstream identifier
- e3adc0d3-9e4b-4b5d-b662-12cec1adff2a
- Tagged by the source as
- Azure Active Directory PersistenceAzure Active Directory Privilege EscalationNOBELIUM GroupScattered Lapsus$ HuntersAzure Active DirectorycloudSplunk CloudSplunk EnterpriseSplunk Enterprise Securitythreat
Licence
- Published under
- Apache License 2.0Read the licence
- Attribution
- Required
- Obtained under
- Apache-2.0Read the origin licence
Authorship
- Published
- Aug 26, 2026
- Version
- 1